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ABSTRACT
Security Is an Important factor If the programs of
Independent and possibly malicious users are to coexist on the
same computer system. In this paper we show that a combined
virtual machine monitor/operating system (VMM/OS) approach to
Information system Isolation provides substantially better
software security than a conventional multiprogramming operating
system approach. This added protection s derived from redundant
security using Independent mechanisms that are Inherent In the
design of most VMM/OS systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade the technique of multiprogramming
(i.e., the concurrent execution of several Independent programs
on the same computer system) has been developed to take full
advantage of medium- and large-scale computer systems (e.g., cost
economics, flexibility, ease of operation, hardware reliability
and redundancy, etc.). Unfortunately, In transferring physically
Isolated Information systems (see Figure (a)) to physically
shared nformation systems (see Figure 1(b)), we must cope with
the problems of: operating system compatibility, reliability, and
security. In this paper we show that the Virtual Machine approach
provides effective solutions to these problems.
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II. VIRTUAL MACHINE APPROACH TO ISOLATION AND COMPATIBILITY
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In Figure 2. A VMM accomplishes
this feat by controlling the multiplexing of the physical
hardware resources In a manner analogous to the way that the
telephone company multiplexes communications enabling separate
and, hopefully, isolated conversations over the same wires.
A VMM Is totally unlike a conventional operating system. A
VMM restricts Itself to the task of multiplexing and allocating
the physical hardware, it presents an Interface that appears
Identical to a "bare machine". In fact, t is necessary to load
a conventional operating system nto each virtual machine in
order to accomplish, useful work. This latter fact provides the
basis for the solution to the operating system compatibility
problem. Each virtual machine Is controlled by a separate, and
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If necessary different, operating system. ! The feasibility of
this solution has been demonstrated on the VM/370 system and the
earlier CP-67 system. The extra VMM software and hardware do
Introduce additlonal overhead In the Information system
operation, but this overhead can be kept rather low (e.g.,
10-15%). Depending upon the precise economics and benefits of a
large-scale system, the VMM approach Is often preferable to the
operation of the multiple physically Isolated real' systems.
III. SECURITY AND RELIABILITY IN A VIRTUAL MACHINE ENVIRONMENT
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Buzen, Chen, and Goldberg (1).
j Contem.norary Operat i n Systelm Envi ronment
Most contemporary operating systems, In conjunction wl th
appropriate hardware support, provide mechanisms to prevent
reliability and security falL res (e.g.., supervisor/problem state
modes of operation, etc.). In this paper we are only concerned
about complete solation security (.e., no user s allowed
access to any other user's information). The problem of
generalized controlled access (i.e., a user Is allowed
restrictive access to another user's information) Is much more
difficult but, fortunately, such a facility s not needed for the
environment illustrated n Figure 1.
Under "ldeal" circumstances, most current operating systems
can provide Isolation security. OS/360, for example, uses the
System/360's lock and key protection to Insulate users from each
other and from the operating system. The supervisor/problem
state modes further prevent users from "gaining control" of the
system. Thus, It should be possible to solate users.
Figure 3(a) Illustrates the
on the same nformation system.
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vulnerable to nvalid'parameters. For example, a popular form of
sabotage s to Issue certain data-returning supervisor calls
(e.g., "what time Is t?" request) providing an Invalid address
as a parameter. The operating system, running with protection
disabled and assuming that the address parameter corresponds to a
user's data area, transfers the return data to that location. If
the address provided actually corresponds to locations within the
operating system, the system can be made to destroy or disable
I tself.
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Referring back to Figure 3(a) we can see some of the factors
contributing to the problem. In order to provide sufficient
functionality to be effective for a large and heterogeneous
collection of user programs, the operating system must be quite
comprehensive and, thus, more vulnerable to error. In general, a
single logical error In the operating system software can
Invalidate the entire security mechanism, Furthermore, as
depicted In Figure 3(a), there is no more protection between the
programs of differing user groups or the operating system than
there is between the application programs of a single user group.
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The security of such conventional operating systems is
sufficiently weak that the military has strict regulations that
appear to forbid the use of the same information system for both
SECRET and TOP SECRET use - even though using separate systems Is
more costly. Even Industrial competitors or different functions
In the same company (e.g., payroll and engineering) are often
reluctant to share the same computer.
2, VYrtual Machl ne Evironment
Figure 3(b) Illustrates the virtual machine approach to a
physically shared system. This arrangement has numerous security
advantages. If we define Ps(P) to be the probability that a
given run of program P will cause a security violation to occur,
the following conditions would be expected to hold:
A. Ps(PIOS(n)) < Ps(PIOS(m)) for n<m
OS(I) refers to a conventional operating system multiprogramming
at level I (I.e., supporting I concurrent programs). The
probability of system failure tends to ncrease with the load on
the operating system (.e., the number of different requests
Issued, the variety of functions provided, the frequency of
requests, etc.). In particular, a monoprogramming system, OS(1),
tends to be much simpler apd reliable 'than a comprehensive
multiprogramming system. Furthermore, the m-degree
multiprogramming system often requires Intricate alterations to
support the special needs of the m users, especially If m Is
large. These problems have been experienced In most large-scale
/ -EU-··LIIII·I-LI- --_1I-I_--_I·_.11-_..-11__1---
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multiprogramming systems. These problems are diminished in a VM
environment since each virtual machine may run a separate
operating system. Each operating system may be simpler and less
error-prone than a single comprehensive all-encompassing
operating system.
B. Ps(OSIVMM(k)) < Ps(PIOS(m)) for k<m
VMH(I) means a virtual machine monitor, VM, supporting I virtual
machines. The operating system, OS, on a particular virtual
machine has the same relationship to the VMM(k) as a user's
program, P, has to a conventional multiprogramming operating
system, OS(m). Using the same rationale as in A above, the
smaller the degree of multiprogramming (i.e., k<m), the smaller
the probability of a security violation, Furthermore, since
virtual machine monitors tend to be shorter, simpler, and easier
to debug than conventional multiprogramming operating systems,
even when k=m, the VMM Is less error-prone, For example, since
the VMM s defined by the hardware specifications of the real
machine, the field engineer's hardware diagnostic software can be
used to checkout the correctness of the VMM.
We can define the probability of a program P on one virtual
machine violating the security of another concurrent program on
another virtual machine as:
C. Ps(PiOS(n)IVMM(k)) = Ps(PIOS(n))xPs(OSIVMM(k))
Based on the Inequalities of A and B above and the multiplicative
dependency In C, we arrive at the conclusion:
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D. Ps(PIOS(n)IVMM(k)) <<(( Ps(PIOS(m)) for n,k<m
Ps(PIOS(n)IVMM(k)) Is the probability of the simultaneous
security failure of P's operating system and the virtual machine
monitor. if a single operating system's security falls, the VMM
Isolates this failure from the other virtual machines. If the
VMM's security fails, It exposes Information of other virtual
machines to the operating system of one virtual machine. But, If
functioning correctly, P's operating system will not take
advantage of the security breach. This assumes that the
designers of the Individual operating systems are not in
collusion with malicious users, this seems to be a reasonable
hypothesis; otherwise, using the same collusion, Ps(PIOS(m))=1
could be attained by subverting the common operating system.
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Alternately, It can be represented as:
Ps(P11,P12,...,P33) = 1 - (1-Ps(P11))x(1-Ps(P12))x...x(1-Ps(P33))
We note that Ps(P11,P12,...,P33) Is minimized when the Individual
Ps's are minimized. The effect Is accentuated due to the
multiplicative nature of Equation E. Thus, from the Inequality
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of D, we conclude:
F. Ps(Pll, P12,...,P3310S(n)IVMM(k)) <<< Ps(P11, P12,...,P3310S(m))
for n,k<m.
That is, the security In a virtual machine environment Is very
much better than In a conventional multiprogramming operating
system environmenti. This conclusion depends upon the
probabilistic Independence of the security failures. In the
following section we show that the Independence condition
applies.
_L Redundant Security Mechanisms
If the Individual operating systems, OS, and the virtual
machine monitor, VMM, used Identical security mechanisms and
algorithms, then any user action that resulted In penetration of
one could also penetrate the other. That Is, first take control
of the OS and then, using the same technique, take control of the
VMM. This s logically analogous to placing one safe Inside
another safe - but having the same combination on both safes. To
combat this danger, the OS and VMM must have redundant security
based upon Independent mechanisms. A similar approach has been
taken In the PRIME modular computer system being constructed at
the University of Californla, Berkeley. They use the term
dvnamic verification to mean "that every time a decision Is made
there Is a consistency check performed on the decision using
Independent hardware and software" (Fabry(2)).
Table 1 Illustrates redundant security mechanisms possible
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In a VMM/OS environment using VM/370 and OS/360 as example
systems. Let us consider main memory security first. OS/360
uses the System/360-370 lock and key hardware to Isolate one
user's memory area from invalid access by another user's program.
VM/370, on the other hand, uses the System/370 Dynamic Address
Translation (DAT) hardware to provide a separate virtual memory
(i.e., address space) for each virtual machine - Independent of
the locks and keys. Thus, a malicious user would have to
overwhelm both the lock and key and the DAT mechanisms to violate
the Isolation security of another coexisting program on another
virtual machine. The software algorithms, of course, used by
OS/360 and V/370 for memory ecurity are quite different since
the mechanisms that are used are so different. Thus, It Is
highly unlikely that they would both be susceptible to the same
penetration techniques.
We find the same kind of redundant security In the area of
secondary storage devices. OS/360, especially with the Resource
Securt y System (RSS) option, provides an elaborate set of
mechanisms to restrict access to data sets (files). Each storage
volume has a recorded label that Is read by OS/360 to verify that
It Is the correct volume to be used (i.e., Automatic Volume
Recognition, AVR). Furthermore, under RSS, the specific data
sets on the volume may be ndividually protected by means of
password codes or user authorization restrictions. VM/370, on
the other hand, may have the volumes assigned to the virtual
machines by the computer operator or a directory on the basis of
-
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FUNCTION 11 VMM Mechanism I OS Mechanism II
II (e.g., VM/370) I (e.g., OS/360) II
Main Memory II Dynamic Address I LQcks and Keys II
Security 11 Translation (DAT)I II
… 44......... ++ . ..............------------------ + ……4--4. ++
Storage Device ii Device Address I Volume Label II
Security II Mapping i Verification and II
II I Data Set Passwordsll
...................++ . . ...... - .--- --- ----------------- ++
Process Allocation II Clock Comparator I Priority Interruptil
Security II and Tlme-Slicing I (and, optionally, Ii
Ii I interval Timer) I I
Table 1.
Examples of Redundant Security Mechanisms In
a VNMM/OS Environment
the physical storage device address being used. Once again, the
logical mapping of OS/360 s Independent of the physical mapping
of VM/370. These redundant security mechanisms can be found In
many other areas.
Although most existing VMMIs were not designed specifically
to provide such comprehensive Isolation, they frequently nclude
substantial redundant security mechanisms. In order to provide
the needed solation, future VMM's may be designed with Increased
redundant secur ty.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown that the VMM/OS approach to
Information system Isolation provides substantially better
-15-
software reliability and security than a conventional
multiprogramming OS approach. This added protection Is obtained
through the use of redundant security mechanisms that are
Inherent in the design of most VMM/OS systems.
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